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Abstract—Software-Defined Networking (SDN) is an emerging
paradigm, which evolved in recent years to address the weaknesses in
traditional networks. The significant feature of the SDN, which is achieved
by disassociating the control plane from the data plane, facilitates network
management and allows the network to be efficiently programmable.
However, the new architecture can be susceptible to several attacks
that lead to resource exhaustion and prevent the SDN controller from
supporting legitimate users. One of these attacks, which nowadays is
growing significantly, is the Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack.
DDoS attack has a high impact on crashing the network resources, making
the target servers unable to support the valid users. The current methods
deploy Machine Learning (ML) for intrusion detection against DDoS
attacks in the SDN network using the standard datasets. However, these
methods suffer several drawbacks, and the used datasets do not contain
the most recent attack patterns - hence, lacking in attack diversity.
In this paper, we propose DDoSNet, an intrusion detection system
against DDoS attacks in SDN environments. Our method is based on
Deep Learning (DL) technique, combining the Recurrent Neural Network
(RNN) with autoencoder. We evaluate our model using the newly released
dataset CICDDoS2019, which contains a comprehensive variety of DDoS
attacks and addresses the gaps of the existing current datasets. We obtain
a significant improvement in attack detection, as compared to other
benchmarking methods. Hence, our model provides great confidence in
securing these networks.
Index Terms—CICDDoS2019 Dataset, DDoS attacks, Deep Learning,
Intrusion Detection System, RNN, SDN
I. INTRODUCTION
Software-Defined Networking (SDN) is a new technology that
facilitates management and programmability of the network system.
SDN makes the network more reliable by centralizing it through sep-
arating the control plane from the data plane. However, the emerging
paradigm is subjected to many security vulnerabilities and new faults
that can be used by attackers to create different types of malicious
attacks [1], [2]. Further, the common threats and attacks which can
exploit the classical network infrastructure can also exist in the SDN
environment [3]. Moreover, these attacks can impact the whole SDN
system that includes multi-devices from different vendors, unlike in
the traditional network where in general an attack, mainly crashes a
part of the network devices from a single vendor only without affecting
the entire network. There are many attack vectors that can exploit the
SDN network [4].
One of the most common and dangerous types of attacks is Dis-
tributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack, which can prevent legitimate
users from access their network services. DDoS attack can deplete
the network resources or target the servers by flooding the network
with a large number of volume traffics. In addition, because of the
IoT era, there are many devices that can be connected to the Internet.
Hence, attackers can exploit many types of DDoS attacks by leveraging
massive numbers of bots from different locations. The execution of
DDoS attacks using bots devices is hard to discover. Additionally,
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these attacks consume the network resources in a very short time.
S. Mohammed [5] reported that an heavy DDoS attack can cause a
loss reaching $100, 000 per hour for some organizations along with
damaging the trust of its customers. The DDoS attacks can overwhelm
different layers of SDN, such as the communication channels between
the SDN controller and open flow switches or the channel between
the controller and application layer. Since SDN has a single point
of failure, if it is overwhelmed by any DDoS attack, then the whole
network simultaneously will fail.
There are two main types of DDoS attacks: volumetric attack [6]
and attack on the application layer [7]. The volumetric attack or
flooding attack saturates and consumes the bandwidth of the network
infrastructure. It commonly uses layer 3 or layer 4 protocols to generate
high volumes of traffic, and common types include ICMP, UDP, and
TCP-SYN flood. The application Layer attack is more sophisticated
and in most cases uses less bandwidth for starting. It targets specific
applications or services and slowly exhausts the network resources.
Attackers can keep the connection open as long as possible by sending
the requested data with a very small packet window. Examples include
HTTP and DNS attacks.
In recent years, a large number of approaches using Machine
Learning (ML) techniques were proposed to detect DDoS attacks [8]–
[11]. The majority of those studies employed the ML for feature
selection methodology to get high performance from the classifiers
systems. However, there are several problems from applying ML on
feature selection techniques. First, with the success of big data and IoT
technology, the size of network traffics are growing fast. The classical
ML classifications have difficulties to work with a large amount of
data due to its limited ability in feature learning. Classical ML gives
better results to find similarities in known attacks than discovering
the outliers activities for unknown malicious attacks [12]. In addition,
the false alarm is significantly high when the amount of data becomes
extremely large. Moreover, the feature selection in classical techniques
mainly needs experts, as the choice of the proper features is achieved
manually in these methods.
Recently, Deep Learning (DL) achieved great success in many
different applications, such as face recognition, image processing, and
natural language translation. DL has the ability to extract the raw fea-
tures from the data without any human intervention. It can satisfy high
performance rate by finding the correlation on raw data automatically.
Hence, with the advent of DL based models, the accuracy in detecting
attacks has further improved. However, the temporal correlations of
network traffic often generate time-series data [13], and training the
simplest form of DL algorithms with sequential traffic can cause a
loss in some data information. To cover this problem and avoid any
loss, we use Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) technique for our
proposed solution. The RNN considers the previous computations with
the current events at any input stage. Training the model with such
methods can keep all data information with minimum loss. We use
standard RNN as we do not focus on learning long-term temporal
dependencies. The standard RNN is simple and takes less time for
training while comparing to the different RNN techniques [14]. In978-1-7281-7374-0/20/$31.00 ©2020 IEEE
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this paper, we propose DDoSNet: a deep learning technique based on
RNN-autoencoder for the detection of DDoS attacks on the SDN. The
proposed model has the best performance in terms of precision, recall,
F1-score and accuracy compared to different classical techniques.
The contribution of this paper includes the following:
• We leverage and propose a deep learning approach based on
RNN-autoencoder for detection of DDoS attacks on the SDN
(DDoSNet). We combine RNN-autoencoder with softmax regres-
sion model at the output layer to classify the network traffic into
malicious or normal.
• We evaluate our model using the new released dataset CI-
CDDoS2019, which contain a comprehensive variety of DDoS
attacks and addresses the gaps of the existing current datasets.
• We benchmark several state-of-the-art ML models that are well
known for detection of DDoS attacks and we evaluate our pro-
posed model in terms of precision, recall, F1-score and accuracy.
Our proposed method has the best performance.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section II discusses
related work on detection of DDoS attacks in SDN environment.
Section III introduces our proposed technique. The new dataset and the
evaluation of our proposed model are presented in Section IV. Finally,
Section V concludes the paper and presents some future work.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we briefly discuss the most recent and popular
mechanisms that have been used for the detection of DDoS attacks
in SDN environments.
Ye et al. in [15] used Support Vector Machine (SVM) classification
algorithm to detect DDoS attack in the SDN network. The authors
adopted six tuple features that can be collected from SDN controller
for the training stage. The dataset samples are collected by simulating
the SDN network using mininet and flood controller with five virtual
hosts. Three different DDoS scenarios are generated during simulation
phase, including UDP, TCP SYN and ICMP flood traffic. Rahman et
al. in [16] conducted four different ML techniques to detect DDoS
attacks under the context of SDN. The authors simulated the normal
and malicious traffic to create Training and Testing Dataset. Two DDoS
samples (TCP and ICMP floods) are generated using hping3 tool.
The experiment results showed that the J48 has better accuracy in
comparison to the other evaluated techniques. Abhiroop et al. in [17]
used three different ML algorithms: SVM, Naive Bayes (NB), and
Neural Network (NN) to detect flow-table overflow attack inside the
SDN data plane. The author’s employed open flow protocol to collect
the tuple features from open flow switches to create training data.
Scapy tool is used to generate three flood traffics such as TCP, UDP
and ICMP flood. Five features are adopted for ML techniques, and
the experiment results show that the SVM gives a low accuracy rate
compared to the last two classifiers.
The authors in [18] introduced two detection models for DDoS
attacks against SDN network. In the first stage, the signature-based
snort detection system was used to collect network traffic. In the
last stage, SVM and Deep Neural Network (DNN) techniques are
employed for attack classification. The authors used the KDDCUP99
dataset for training the two detection modules based on 7 features from
a total of 41. The experiment results proved that the DNN performs
better than SVM with accuracy rate of 92.30 and 74.30%, respectively.
Mohammed et al. [5] proposed a new framework for detection of
DDoS attacks on SDN. NSL-KDD dataset with 25 selected features
was used for training NB classifier. The authors run three different
selection algorithms (Genetic, Ranker, Greedy) together and select the
combined features from the dataset. The average values of Precision,
Recall, and F1-score are 0.81, 0.77, and 0.77, respectively.
Most of the detection systems in the literature, which simulated the
SDN network to generate the DDoS attacks dataset consider only a
reduced number of malicious activities, only for IP or TCP protocol,
without considering any applications layer DDoS attacks. One of
the challenges to detect application layer DDoS attacks is the high
similarity of attacks and the benign behaviors. Hence, there is a lack of
available features to define such attacks, and therefore, many detection
systems are not suitable to identify it [19]. In addition, the simulated
traffics are generated using tools like Scapy and Hping3. Hence, the
produced dataset is small and does not contain the complete traffic
to provide accurate results. Additionally, the existing techniques that
are using public datasets to train anomaly detection systems suffer of
several issues. For example, most of the datasets are out of date and
do not contain the new type of attacks traffic. Besides, they contain
few types of attacks to address all trends found in the Internet today. A
comprehensive and valid dataset has a great impact on the evaluation
of detection algorithms and techniques systems. Thus, to evaluate our
proposed model, we are using the newest public available dataset
CICDDoS2019 [20], which contain a comprehensive variety of DDoS
attacks and addresses the gaps of the existing current datasets.
III. PROPOSED MODEL
In this section, we introduce the architecture of our proposed model
DDoSNet. DDoSNet is based on autoencoder and RNN deep neural
network.
Autoencoder is a type of artificial natural network, which is de-
ployed in many applications such as data noise filtration or image
processing. The reason we used autoencoder in this work is because
of the fact that the autoencoder can significantly increase the anomaly
detection accuracy compared to linear and kernel Principal Component
Analysis (PCA) [21]. It can detect subtle anomalies, which linear PCA
fails to detect. Furthermore, the autoencoder is easy to train and does
not require complex computation like kernel PCA.
The autoencoder is composed of three separate layers. The first layer
is the input layer, which receives the original input Xi and encodes,
decodes it through several consecutive hidden layers (encoder and
decoder blocks). The encoded features at the encoder phase have a
smaller dimension than the input data, while in the decoder phase,
the encoded features are reconstructed in reverse order to generate
the final output at last layer. The generated output feature vector X̂i
is approximately equal to the original input data. We combined the
autoencoder with the standard RNN mechanism to generate a better
detection model for detection of DDoS attacks. RNN can address
the problem of tradition feed-forward neural networks [22]. As a
result, it can create much powerful models with high classification
accuracy. RNN is widely applied in different domain applications
such as language processing and speech recognition. Unlike the feed-
forward neural networks, the cyclic connections of the RNN can be
effectively used for modeling sequences [23]. In RNN, for the given
input vector sequence X = (x1, x2, x3, ...., xt), we can compute the
hidden vector Z = (z1, z2, z3, ...., zt) and output vector sequence
F = (f1, f2, f3, ...., ft) at time t using Eq.1 and Eq.2, respectively.
zt = σ(WxzXt +Wzzzt−1 + bh), (1)
ft =Wzfht + bf , (2)
where σ is the activation function, W is the weight, b is the bias
and zt−1 is the state at time t− 1.
Our model can learn a vector representation of the input data in a
comprehensive manner. Figure 1 describes our proposed architecture
for intrusion detection. The proposed model contains two stages:
unsupervised pre-training stage and fine-tuning stage. The first stage
is employed to extract the useful feature representation of the input
data. We trained the RNN-autoencoder architecture in an unsupervised
setting, without the labels to generate the compressed representation of
the inputs data. Each layer of the autoencoder is a simple RNN layer.
We used four hidden layers in the encoder phase, with the number of
channels equal to 64, 32, 16, and 8, respectively. The channel number
of the decoder phase is in the reverse order of the encoder block with
number of channels as 8, 16, 32, and 64, respectively. After we obtain
the desirable values of the weight and bias, the RNN-autoencoder is
able to learn the hierarchical features from the unlabeled data. Next,
fine-tuning training (supervised) is conducted to train the last layer of
the network using labeled samples. Implementing the fine-tuning using
supervised training criterion can further optimize the whole network
[24]. We use softmax regression layer with two channels at the top
layer. The output of the softmax function is in the range of (0, 1)
for each label class, where the total probability values for all classes
is equal to unity.
Fig. 1: Our proposed model for detecting attacks in a SDN network.
IV. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY
A. Dataset
One of the most extensive challenges for ML/DL intrusion detection
approaches is the availability of the datasets. The main reason for
the lack of datasets in the intrusion detection domain returns to
privacy and illegal issues. The network traffic contains very sensitive
information, where the availability of such information can reveal
customers and business secrets, or even the personal communication.
To cover the previous gap, many researchers simulate their own data
to avoid any sensitive concerns. However in these situations most of
the datasets generated are not comprehensive and the row samples
considered are not sufficient to cover the application behaviors. The
most popular public datasets, which have been used extensively for
intrusion detection are KDDCUP99 [25], NSL-KDD [26], Kyoto
2006+ [27], ISCX2012 [28], and CICIDS2017 [29]. More details about
different datasets used for intrusion domain can be found in [30].
In this paper, we evaluate our proposed classifier using the new
released CICDDoS2019 dataset [20]. The dataset contains a large
amount of different DDoS attacks that can be carried out through
application layer protocols using TCP/UDP. The taxonomy of attacks
in the dataset are performed in terms of exploitation-based and
reflection-based attacks. The dataset was collected in two separated
days for training and testing evaluation. The training set was captured
on January 12th, 2019, and contains 12 different kinds of DDoS attacks,
each attack type in a separated PCAP file. The attack types in the
training day includes UDP, SNMP, NetBIOS, LDAP, TFTP, NTP, SYN,
WebDDoS, MSSQL, UDP-Lag, DNS, and SSDP DDoS based attack.
The testing data was created on March 11th, 2019, and contains 7
DDoS attacks SYN, MSSQL, UDP-Lag, LDAP, UDP, PortScan, and
NetBIOS. The distribution of the different attacks in the dataset is
shown in Figure 2. The PortScan attack in the testing set not present
in the training data for intrinsic evaluation of detection system. The
dataset contains more than 80 flow features1 and was extracted using
CICFlowMeter tools [31]. The CICDDoS2019 dataset is available on
the website of Canadian Institute for Cybersecurity2 in both PCAP file
and flow format based.
The classical ML techniques are working better in feature extraction
instead of raw data. Selecting the proper features in intrusion systems
is not an easy task and requires the help of experts. Furthermore, the
attack scenarios evolve every day, and thus selecting relevant features
for a specific type of attack is not a suitable solution. The majority
of the real-world data take the approach of non-linear or multivariate
data. It is hard to visualize the data in more than three-dimension. We
use the Andrew curve [32] for better understanding of the distribution
of multidimensional data. Andrew curve is based on the Fourier series,
and it is widely applied for multivariate data visualization. To analyze
the testing data using the Andrew curve, we select random 10 % of
sample data and reduce its feature dimensions to 20 using the PCA
technique to get optimal results and speed the calculation. The graph
in Figure 3 shows the complex relationship for malicious and normal
features in the dataset. Each line in the curve represents different
observations in the data – Attack and Benign. It is clear that the
subgroups of input data are interlinked with each other, which indicates
a high degree of non-linearity in the feature space of observed data.
As a result, it shows that the classical ML methods are not operating
well with multivariate datasets.
B. Data Preprocessing
We prepare the data to be suitable for the training model directly.
CICDDoS2019 dataset is available in a flow-based format where more
than 80 features are extracted using CICFlowMeter. We follow a few
steps to prepare the data before the module training.
• Removing socket features: we remove all of the socket features
like source and destination IP, Source and destination port, times-
tamp, and flow ID. These features vary from network to network,
and we need to train the model with packet characteristics itself.
Furthermore, both the intruder and normal users can have the
same IP address. Therefore, training the DL model with socket
information can cause an overfitting problem, as the model can
be biased to the socket information. We obtained a number of 77
features for the model input after removing the unwanted features.
• Cleaning the data: the original data contains a large amount of
missing (nan) and infinity values - we remove all these values
from the data.
• Normalize the input data: the features data have different numer-
ical values. Training the model directly with the original data can
cause classification error, and then the model takes much time
during its training. We normalize the data where the minimum
value is zero, and the maximum is one.
• Encoding the labeled data: we trained our model for binary
classification to classify the input traffic into normal or malicious.
Therefore, we consider all DDoS classes as attack category,
besides the normal traffic. Then, we are encoding the string
value for normal and attack label to binary value of 0 and 1,
respectively.
1http://www.netflowmeter.ca/netflowmeter.html.
2https://www.unb.ca/cic/datasets/ddos-2019.html.
Fig. 2: The distribution of DoS and DDoS attack inside the CICDDoS2019 dataset [20].
Fig. 3: We plot the Andrews curve for the CICDDoS2019 dataset. It
is clear that the feature space obtains high degree of non-linearity.
C. Experimental Setup
1) Training RNN-autoencoder: We split the dataset into three
sections of training, validation, and testing subset. We build the model
using the training set to adjust the weight on the neural network.
The validation set is used to fine-tune the experiment parameters i.e.
classifier architecture (not weights) like the number of hidden layers
in the proposed model. Besides, the test set is used to estimate the
model accuracy or performance. In this paper, we used the train-
test split technique for the model evaluation instead of the k-fold
cross-validation technique. Although cross-validation is a widely used
method in classification evaluation, we do not use it in our case. The
inherent serial correlation of the time series data makes the use of
cross-validation less suitable for these problems [33].
In this experiment, the softmax layer takes the decoder output
and classifies the input data into normal or attack traffic. We used
categorical-crossentropy as loss function with adam op-
timizer and ReLU function for activation in all different layers. We
trained the model using the number of epochs of 50 and a batch size
of 32. Figure 4 describes the trend of training and validation loss over
the number of epochs. We observe that the training and validation loss
converges and reaches the minimum value after 10 epochs. We chose
the model with the least validation loss. We run several experiments
using different values of learning rate to get optimal results. The
selective learning rate for this experiment is 0.0001. More details about
the impact of the learning rate are discussed subsequently.
Fig. 4: Trend of training and validation loss over the number of epochs.
2) Hyper-parameter Tuning: The trained model behavior is directly
controlled by the values of the hyper-parameters, where selecting
the best values plays a key role in the success of neural network
architecture. However, selecting the best values of hyper-parameters is
still dependent on the best practice or human knowledge. We conducted
various experiments to select the optimal values of experiment hyper-
parameters. We tested the performance of the model using different
learning rate values i.e. 0.1, 0.01, 0.001 and 0.0001. Table I shows
the performance metrics of the RNN-autoencoder model with different
learning rates. Based on the obtained results, we can conclude that the
model consumed a long time during the training process when we
reduced the learning rate value. However, the model achieved batter
results using a smaller value of learning rate. It can be observed that
the model achieved overall accuracy up to 99% when the learning
rate is decreased to 0.0001. Furthermore, we changed the number of
hidden layers, iteration, number of channels per hidden layer, and the
activation function for each learning rate value. The best performance
is achieved when we used four hidden layers. When the number of
hidden layers is increased, the model accuracy remains constant, but
the training increases considerably. Therefore, we use four layers in our
proposed framework. As a result, the four layers are more convincing
to give reasonable results.
3) Data Partitioning: The performance of the classification meth-
ods not only depends on the used technique but also on the manner
in which training- and testing- data is partitioned. Previous work by
Rasool et al. [34] tested the effect of data partitioning strategies on the
accuracy of the classifier. They approved that classifier performance
is increased when the training data is gradually increased. The best
performance is obtained when 70% of the input data is used for
training. After we prepared the input data, the final training data has 77
input features. Furthermore, the distribution of samples in the dataset
is different and extremely large. We use samples from each attack type
to obtain a balanced dataset with respect to different types of attacks.
In our case, the total number of samples for training and validation
sets are 161523 and 46150, respectively. To get a realist detection rate,
we used attack records in the testing set that are not represented in
the training phase. The total number of records in testing set is 23000
samples.
TABLE I: Performance evaluation of the proposed model with different
learning rate.
Learning rates
Performance metrics
Precision Recall F-score Accuracy (%)Attack Benign Attack Benign Attack Benign
0.1 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.97 97
0.01 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.98 98
0.001 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.99 99
0.0001 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 99
D. Evaluation
We use the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve to
evaluate how well the model performs accurately. The ROC curve
indicates the relation between two parameters: True and False classes.
The area underneath the ROC Curve (AUC) measures separability
between false positive and true positive rate. Figure 5 shows that our
model gives AUC of 98.8, which means that our proposed model is
able to separate 98.8% of positive and negative classes successfully.
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Fig. 5: Receiver Operating Curve (ROC) for our proposed model.
We also illustrate the confusion matrix in order to describe the clas-
sification performance of our model. The confusion matrix summarizes
the correct and false predictions. Table II indicates that our model can
detect all the attack and normal classes with good accuracy of 0.99.
TABLE II: Confusion matrix on the four distinct events (TP, FP, TN,
FN) obtained using our proposed approach.
Attack 0.99 0.01
Normal 0.01 0.99
Attack Normal
Furthermore, we also use various metrics to evaluate our proposed
model, such as precision, recall, precision, F-score and accuracy, in
order to have a systematic benchmarking analysis with other related
approaches. These metrics are commonly used in intrusion detection
systems and are defined as follows:
Precision =
TP
TP + FP
(3)
Recall =
TP
TP + FN
(4)
F-score =
2× Precision × Recall
Precision + Recall
(5)
Accuracy =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
(6)
where True Positive (TP) and True Negative (TN) represent the
values that are correctly predicted. In contrast, False Positives (FP)
and False Negatives (FN) indicate misclassified events.
We compare our model with various classical ML techniques. In this
evaluation, we consider 6 different algorithms Decision Tree (DT), NB,
Booster, Random Forest (RF), SVM, and Logistic Regression (LR).
Table III represents the classification metrics for normal and attack
classes of our model with different classical techniques. The obtained
results show that the DDoSNet model performs better than the other
ML algorithms. We observed that our proposed model performed the
best, followed by LR and SVM. The NB classifier performed poorly,
primarily because the NB assumed that all attributes are independent
of each other [35]. Therefore, its performance got impacted, as the
considered feature attributes are dependent on each other.
TABLE III: Performance evaluation of the proposed model with other
classical ML algorithms. Our proposed approach performs best, as
compared to the other benchmarking algorithms.
Techniques Precision Recall F-score Accuracy (%)Attack Benign Attack Benign Attack Benign
NB 1.00 0.53 0.17 1.00 0.29 0.69 57
DT 0.70 0.98 0.99 0.54 0.82 0.70 77
Booster 0.76 0.99 0.99 0.67 0.86 0.80 84
RF 1.00 0.78 0.74 1.00 0.85 0.88 86
SVM 0.99 0.88 0.88 0.99 0.93 0.93 93
LR 0.93 0.99 0.99 0.91 0.96 0.95 95
Proposed DDoSNet 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 99
E. Discussions
The novel contribution of this paper is to represent the potential of
DL for anomaly detection systems. We proposed a new DL technique
based on RNN-Autoencoder to classify the input traffic into normal
or malicious types. The proposed DL model can reduce the data
dimensionality by automatically extracting the features from input
data. Compared to shallow learners, our technique achieved the best
performance in terms of precision, recall, F1-score, and accuracy.
The ability of DL to deal with a high degree of complex non-
linear relationship makes them promising techniques for detecting
network intrusion. It can be used to tackle the limitation of the
traditional classification methods, which are implemented to identify
the anomalies traffic based on domain knowledge [36]. However, with
the continuous development of Internet traffic and the advent of the era
of big data, many new attack characteristics are derived from known
attacks, and it is hard to distinguish between them. Our model can
be implemented as an application layer of the SDN controller, such as
in [37]. The detected malicious traffic can be blocked using null routing
method or redirected to a honeypot server for further investigation.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Network virtualization leads to new threats and new exploitable
attacks that the ones already existing in the traditional network. The
DDoS attack class is considered one of the most aggressive attack types
in recent years, causing a critical impact on the whole network system.
In this paper, we proposed a new model DDoSNet that is based on
DL for the detection of DDoS attacks against SDN network. We used
the new released CICDDoS2019 dataset for training and evaluation
of our proposed model. The dataset contains comprehensive and most
recent DDoS types of attacks. The evaluation of our model showed
that DDoSNet gives the highest evaluation metrics in terms of recall,
precision, F-score, and accuracy compared to the existing well known
classical ML techniques.
In the future, we are interested in testing the performance of our
proposed model on other datasets. In this current work, we used a
binary classification framework to classify the input traffic into normal
and malicious types. However, it is also necessary to classify each
individual attack types separately. We intend to extend our work to a
multi-class classification framework. Furthermore, we will simulate the
SDN network with various types of environments and attack traffics to
create a heterogeneous dataset that can effectively represent the current
internet traffic.
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